Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth-conditional semantics: truth-conditional semantics assume that the meaning of sentences can be determined by determining their truth value ("true" or "false"). It is assumed that the sentence components contribute to the meaning of the entire sentence, and the links ("and", "or", etc.) have the meaning which results from the logical truth tables. An example for a non-truth-conditional semantics is the conditional role semantics. See also compositionality, Frege-Principle, truth values, analyticity/syntheticity, understanding, semantics._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Stalnaker on Truthconditional Semantics - Dictionary of Arguments
I 50 Truthconditional Semantics/Stalnaker: truthconditional semantics are more than a mere distinction between true and false sentences. They are a practice of claiming. >Assertions, >Assertibility. Instead of an explanation of the reference we need a notion of content. >Content. Truth is not sufficient. Content: content is more than an ascription of truth values. It is communication and information. Problem: if in an area all sentences are necessarily truth or false, it is not clear how we should represent the content. >Indeterminacy, >Truth functions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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> Counter arguments against Stalnaker
> Counter arguments in relation to Truthconditional Semantics
